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Some influential arguments in the metaphysics of 
consciousness, in particular Chalmers’ Zombie Argu-
ment, suppose that all the physical properties of com-
posed physical systems are metaphysically necessitated 
by their fundamental constituents. In this paper I argue 
against this thesis in order to debate Chalmers’ argu-
ment. By discussing, in non-technical terms, an EPR 
system I try to show that there are good reasons to hold 
that some composed physical systems have properties 
which are nomologically necessitated by their funda-
mental constituents, i.e., which emerge in the sense of 
the socalled ‘nomological supervenience’ views. 
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Abstract
Some influential arguments in the metaphysics of consciousness, in particular Chalmers’ Zombie 
Argument, suppose that all the physical properties of composed physical systems are metaphysically 
necessitated by their fundamental constituents. In this paper I argue against this thesis in order to debate 
Chalmers’ argument. By discussing, in non-technical terms, an EPR system I try to show that there are 
good reasons to hold that some composed physical systems have properties which are nomologically 
necessitated by their fundamental constituents, i.e., which emerge in the sense of the socalled ‘nomological 
supervenience’ views.
Keywords
Philosophy of Mind, Zombie Argument, Phenomenal Consciousness, Physicalism, Emergence, Bell’s 
Theorems 
Un argument émergentiste pour l’impossibilité des 
zombies
Résumé
Des arguments parmi les plus influents dans la métaphysique de la conscience, en particulier « l’argument 
des zombies » de Chalmers, supposent que toutes les propriétés physiques des systèmes physiques 
composés résultent avec une nécessité métaphysique de leurs constituants fondamentaux. Dans cet 
article je remets en question cette idée et l’argument de Chalmers. A travers la discussion, en termes 
non techniques, d’un système EPR, j’essaye de montrer qu’il y a de bonnes raisons pour soutenir que 
certains systèmes physiques composés ont des propriétés qui résultent avec nécessité nomologique de 
leurs constituants fondamentaux, c’est-à-dire, qui émergent dans le sens des théories de « survenance 
nomologique ».
Mots-clefs
Philosophie de l’esprit, argument des zombies, conscience phénoménale, physicalisme, émergence,  
théorème de Bell
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IntroductionChalmers (Chalmers D., 1996)advanced a still influential argument, labelled ‘The Zombie Argument’, to state that consciousness is not a physical prop-
erty1. He claimed that a world identical to the 
actual one in all its physical aspects, but where 
there is no phenomenal consciousness (Nagel T., 
1974; Block N., 1998), is conceivable. Thereby he 
concluded that, in the actual world, consciousness 
is not a physical property. He wrote:
1. In our world, there are conscious experiences.
2. There is a logically possible world physic-
ally identical to ours, in which the positive 
facts about consciousness in our world do not 
hold22.
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are fur-
ther facts about our world, over and above the 
physical facts.
4. So materialism is false (Chalmers D., 1996: 
123)3.
The question is if ‘there is’ a metaphysically pos-
sible world W* which is an exact physical replica 
of the actual world W and yet lacks conscious-
ness. For the physicalist, there is no such world. 
He takes consciousness to be a physical property 
and, therefore, he would claim that an exact rep-
lica of W in every physical aspect would neces-
sarily include consciousness. However, this claim 
alone would beg the question as Chalmers pre-
sented it. Chalmers argued for the possibility of 
the zombie world’ W* with a line of reasoning 
that is based on a ‘global supervenience’ claim:
If,
(premise 1) Facts about consciousness are not 
microphysical facts4.
1. The Zombie Argument is a version of ‘the Conceivability 
Argument’ advanced by (Kripke S., 1980) and others. See 
(Chalmers D., 2010).
2. Chalmers strongly relates logical modality with meta-
physical modality: “[...] the metaphysically possible worlds 
are just the logically possible worlds (and [...] metaphysical 
possibility of statements is logical possibility with an a pos-
teriori twist)” (Chalmers D., 1996: 38).
3. In (Chalmers D., 2002; Chalmers D., 2010) Chalmers 
presents the argument with an alternative form that stress-
es the entailment from conceivability to possibility: “If it is 
conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically pos-
sible that there are zombies” (Chalmers D., 2010: 107), and 
argues for the validity of this entailment.
4. This premise amounts to the exclusion of panpsychism, 
which Chalmers discusses in (Chalmers D., 1996), (Chal-
And,
(premise 2) “[H]igh-level facts and laws are 
entailed [with logical necessity] by all the 
microphysical facts (perhaps along with micro-
physical laws)” (p. 71).
Then,
(conclusion 1) A world W* microphysically 
identical to the actual world W “will have the 
same macroscopic structure as ours, and the 
same macroscopic dynamics” (p. 73).
And yet,
(conclusion 2) There would be no conscious 
experiences in W*.
The purpose of this paper is to contest Chalmers’ 
Argument. To do so, I shall not question the main 
intuition behind it: that facts about consciousness 
cannot result (panpsychism aside) from micro-
physical facts in virtue of a metaphysical neces-
sitation relation5. Instead, I will argue against 
the acceptance of premise 2—a central tenet of 
‘microphysicalism’—by favouring a ‘nomological 
supervenience’ variety of physicalist emergentism 
(NS-emergentism)6. The argument I will advance 
is grounded on Bell’s (Bell J., 1964) Theorem, 
which concerns the correlations in EPR experi-
ments. I should emphasise that this argument will 
be presented without technical terms or formulas; 
no training in quantum mechanics is required to fol-
low it.
To be sure, in the philosophy of science arguments 
for emergentism based on quantum entangle-
ment and critiques to microphysicalism have a 
relatively long history7. But note, first, that in the 
philosophy of mind microphysicalism remains as 
a prevalent view among physicalists. In Papineau’s 
words, “many […] philosophers seem to think of 
physicalism as some kind of commitment to the 
primacy of the microscopic. In their view, physic-
alism doesn’t just say that everything is physical.
mers D., 2002) and (Chalmers D., 2010).
5. This intuition frequently underlies as well arguments for 
panpsychism. See, e.g., (Strawson G. et al., 2006).
6. Emergentism is not always conceived as a form of phy-
sicalism. Indeed, (Crane T., 2001) claims that it is incom-
patible with physicalism, and some authors, e.g. (Nida-Rü-
melin M., 2006), propose emergentist views as forms of 
dualism.
7. For an extensive discussion of microphysicalism see 
(Hüttemann A., 2004). Concerning arguments for the exis-
tence of emergent properties based on quantum entangle-
ments, (Humphreys N., 2008) is among the most influential.
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It also says that everything is microscopically 
determined” (Papineau D., 2008: 126). Secondly, 
note that the majority of arguments for emergent 
properties in physics concern weak emergence or 
epistemological emergence, and are rarely applied 
in a straightforward manner in the metaphysics 
of consciousness8. This paper is an attempt to con-
tribute to the debate of The Zombie Argument 
by showing, with a relatively simple case, why 
and how NS-emergentism threatens its validity. 
I shall not advance an original interpretation of 
Bell’s Theorem or a new view on emergentism.
Surely, the interpretation of quantum mechanics 
and, in particular, the interpretation and signifi-
cance of Bell’s Theorem, are open questions that 
are still highly debated. However, it is fair to claim 
that there is wide agreement on the idea that will 
be central: Bell’s Theorem plus the empirical 
adequacy of quantum mechanics provide strong 
reasons for believing in the existence of nonlocal 
effects in nature9.
In the following sections, first, I will introduce 
the central notions that I will be using. Second, 
I will describe a two-particle EPR experiment 
and introduce Bell’s Theorem. Third, I will pro-
pose an emergentist interpretation of nonlocal 
correlations. Forth, I shall elaborate on the con-
sequences of the previous interpretation of Chal-
mers’ ZombieArgument and address five plaus-
ible objections.
Physicalism, 
supervenience and related 
notions
In this section I will advance the definitions of 
supervenience’, ‘physicalism’, ‘microphysicalism’ 
and ‘NS-emergentism’ I shall adopt.
Supervenience
Chalmers defines ‘supervenience’ in a canon-
ical way, as follows: “B-properties supervene on 
A-properties if no two possible situations are 
identical with respect to their A-properties while 
8. For the distinctions weak/strong emergence and ontolo-
gical/epistemological emergence, see (Chalmers, D. 1996) 
and (O’Connor T., Wong H., 2012) respectively. Arguments 
for the existence of emergent properties in physics that, 
explicitly or arguably, present ontological views, include (An-
derson P., 1972), (Humphreys N., 1997), (Sewell G., 2002), 
(Mainwood P., 2006) and (Howard D., 2007).
9. For a survey of the current state of opinion regarding 
Bell’s Theorem, see (Bell M., Gao S., forthcoming).
differing in their B-properties”10(Chalmers D., 
1996: 33). A-properties constitute the ‘superven-
ience base’ of B-properties. He introduces this 
concept in order to elaborate the aforementioned 
premise 2 and conclusion 1. This definition con-
cerns properties, but analogous definitions can 
be stated to relate other kinds of items like enti-
ties, structures, facts, events, and laws. I will use 
‘supervenience’ in this more general sense. 
Supervenience is a reflective, transitive and 
non-symmetric relation. Now, let us distinguish, 
as is usually done, between ‘logical supervenience’ 
(L-supervenience) and ‘nomological superven-
ience’ (N-Supervenience) depending on whether 
the modal operator in ‘possible situations’ quan-
tifies over logically or nomologically possible 
worlds respectively. N-supervenience must be 
distinguished from nomological supervenience 
emergence (NS-emergence). As we will see, in 
NS-emergence there must be a fundamental law 
of nature linking the emergence base with the 
emergent property. By contrast, N-Superven-
ience admits a metaphysical necessitation relation 
as the link between the supervenience base and 
the supervenient property11.
Physicalism
Imagine a world W* defined as an exact physical 
replica of the actual world W: Every physical 
entity of W, with its properties and history, has 
a qualitatively identical counterpart in W*1212. If 
physicalism is true, then for W* to be a physical 
replica of W is for it to be a replica tout court: 
Everything that exists or obtains in W has an 
identical counterpart in W*. All the organisms, 
persons, institutions, facts, events, etc., of W, are 
replicated in W*. On the contrary, if physicalism 
is false, then W and W* differ: some entities of 
W lack their counterpart in W*. Accordingly, I 
take physicalism to be the view that all the enti-
ties inhabiting the actual world, their properties, 
and all the facts and events involving them, have 
a physical nature in the following sense:
(Physical Nature) An item has a physical nature 
if it L-supervenes on a set of physical items.
Here, ‘physical items’ includes physical enti-
ties, their properties, and their spatiotemporal 
10. About supervenience see, e.g., (McLaughlin B., 1995).
11. This is so because a metaphysical necessitation relation 
holds in every nomologically possible world.
12. By ‘the history’ of a physical entity I mean its complete-
trajectory relative to some frame of reference of space-time.
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histories. Clearly, if physicalism holds the totality 
of physical items in our world constitutes a suffi-
cient supervenience base for everything there is in 
it, including in particular social reality in Searle’s 
sense (Searle J., 1995).
I shall not attempt to provide a complete account 
of what it is for an item to be physical. This would 
require an extensive digression with little chances 
of success13. Intuitively, it is clear that a proton, a 
molecule and electric charge are physical items. 
By contrast, cheques and prices are not, even 
though they have a ‘physical nature’ if physicalism 
holds. I will briefly come back to this question 
latter.
Physics, being an empirical science, is open to 
substantial revisions. But let us accept the stan-
dard atomistic picture it proposes: Physical enti-
ties are either (simple) particles or systems com-
posed by them, and the laws of physics govern 
(or describe) the way these entities interact with 
each other14. I will label ‘basic properties’ the ones 
that are instantiated by particles; ‘high proper-
ties’ the ones that are systemic, i.e., instantiated 
by physical systems as a whole; and ‘non-physical 
properties’ the remaining ones (which have a 
physical nature if physicalism holds). Note that 
some properties can be attributed as high or as 
basic, for instance mass and electric charge, while 
others can only be attributed as high, for instance 
temperature and rigidity.
Microphysicalism
Imagine a world W** defined as an exact micro-
physical replica of the actual world W: All of the 
most basic physical entities of W, together with 
their properties and history, have qualitatively 
identical counterparts in W**. If microphysicalism 
is true, then for W** to be a microphysical replica 
of W is for it to be a replica tout court: Every-
thing that exists or obtains in W has an identical 
counterpart in W**. In addition to persons, insti-
tutions, etc., in W** are replicated all the  com-
posed physical systems of W together with their 
properties, e.g., the macroscopic objects that are 
rigid and have a given temperature. On the con-
trary, if microphysicalism is false, then W and W** 
13. For a definition of ‘the physical’ aimed at avoiding Hem-
pel’s dilemma see, e.g., (Papineau D., 2008).
14. I use ‘particles’ in a wide sense. In quantum mechanics 
there is a wave-particle duality, and quantum field theory 
provides a unified frame for particles and fields. For instance, 
electrons are treated as excitations of an electron field, and 
the excitations of the electromagnetic field are photons.
differ. Analogously to the case when physical-
ism is false, W and W** may differ regarding, say, 
social phenomena. But now, unlike the case when 
physicalism is false, W and W** can also differ in 
physical respects: some composed physical enti-
ties of W may lack an identical counterpart in 
W**.
Accordingly, I take the central thesis of micro-
physicalism to be, using Chalmers’ words, that 
“high-level facts and laws are entailed [with 
logical necessity] by all the microphysical facts 
(perhaps along with microphysical laws)” (Chal-
mers D., 1996: 71). Now, the ‘microphysical facts’, 
strictly speaking, are those that exclusively involve 
simple particles. Therefore, microphysicalism can 
be stated as the view that all the entities inhabit-
ing the actual world, their properties, and all the 
acts and events involving them, have a micro-
physical nature in the following sense15:
(Microphysical Nature) An item has a micro-
physical nature if it L-supervenes on a set of 
basic physical items.
‘Basic physical items’ exclusively includes (simple) 
particles, their properties, and their spatiotemp-
oral histories. Clearly, if microphysicalism holds 
the totality of basic physical items in our world 
constitutes a sufficient supervenience base for 
everything there is in it including, besides social 
constructs, composed physical systems with their 
(high) properties and relations.
Note that the microphysical reality on which, 
according to microphysicalism, everything 
L-supervenes, should not be conceived as involv-
ing items not belonging to the lowest level of 
physical ontology. Otherwise, microphysicalism 
would lose what makes it appealing in the first 
place: the idea that everything can be ontologic-
ally reduced in terms of simple entities, with their 
(basic) properties and relations, without residue. 
Moreover, if ‘the microphysical’ were to include 
items beyond the basic ones, a sharp distinction-
between this fundamental level and higher ones 
could hardly be justified.
Microphysicalism is intuitively clear and has 
the advantage of proposing an austere ontology. 
15. For (Hüttemann A., 2004) microphysicalism can be 
articulated in at least three different ways: as a thesis of 
‘micro-determination’ (that concerns properties), as a the-
sis of ‘micro-government’ (involving laws), and as a thesis 
of ‘micro-causation’. With the inclusion of a few plausible 
assumptions it is possible to derive these theses from the 
articulation in terms of L-supervenience I advanced.
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Imagine we have to create an exhaustive inven-
tory of all the items that ever existed or obtained 
in the actual world. If microphysicalism is true, 
when we include all the basic physical items the 
inventory is complete. It is undoubtedly useful for 
epistemological purposes to include items that are 
not basic, but these would be redundant from the 
ontological point of view1616.
Certainly, microphysicalism looks appealing and 
is easily taken as being a central tenet of con-
temporary natural science. Indeed, for Chalmers 
(Chalmers D., 1996; Chalmers D., 2010) mater-
ialist monism is committed to microphysicalism. 
For instance, he writes: “It is widely agreed that 
materialism requires that P necessitates all truths” 
(Chalmers D., 2010: 110, my italics), where “P 
[is] the conjunction of all microphysical truths 
about the universe” (Chalmers D., 2010: 110, my 
italics). However, the argument I will present, 
if sound, shows that contemporary natural sci-
ence warrants the plausibility of the denial of 
microphysicalism.
One may wonder if it is not the case that the 
truth of microphysicalism entails the truth phys-
icalism and if, conversely, the truth of physicalism 
does not entail the truth of microphysicalism. It 
should be clear that the truth of microphysical-
ism logically entails the truth of physicalism: if 
microphysicalism is true, a microphysical replica 
of W is also a physical replica of W. In contrast, 
whether the truth of physicalism entails the truth 
of microphysicalism is an empirical question: that 
a microphysical replica of W is also a physical rep-
lica of W is not an a priori true statement. Indeed, 
I will motivate on empirical grounds the thesis 
that this statement is false. After showing that 
NS-emergentism is incompatible with micro-
physicalism, I will argue, on the basis of contem-
porary physics, for the plausibility of the thesis 
that there are NS-emergent physical properties 
in nature. If this thesis is right, the worlds W* 
and W** (as defined before) do differ: There are 
NS-emergent properties in the actual world W 
which are replicated (by definition) in W* but not 
(for empirical reasons) in W**.
16. Microphysicalism is not committed to epistemological 
reductionism, i.e., it does not entail the possibility of redu-
cing to basic physical theory every other scientific theory.
NS-Emergentism
As mentioned, I will be concerned with NS-Emer-
gence, which is an ontological and synchronic view. 
I shall adopt McLaughlin’s definition1717:
If P is a property of w, then P is emergent 
if and only if (1) P supervenes with nomo-
logical necessity, but not with logical neces-
sity, on properties the parts of w have taken 
separately or in other combinations; and (2) 
some of the supervenience principles linking 
properties of the parts of w with w’s having P 
are fundamental laws […] A law L is funda-
mental if and only if it is not metaphysically 
necessitated by any other laws, even together 
with initial conditions. (McLaughlin B., 1997: 
p. 39)
NS-Emergence is ontological in the follow-
ingsense: the emergent properties are conceived 
as something ‘over and above’ the correspond-
ing emergence bases18. Even though their exist-
ence depends on the existence of the bases, they 
are further constituents of reality. Ontological 
views, in general, are motivated by the intuition 
that, even though there surely are tight relations 
between high properties and basic ones, and even 
though we can better understand higher-levels 
with models at lower-levels, some high proper-
ties— the emergent ones—are (at least) as real as 
the basic ones are considered to be19.
NS-Emergence is synchronic because the emer-
gent properties are conceived as coexisting with 
the corresponding emergence bases. Note that 
synchronic relations of emergence cannot be 
causal (at least in orthodox views, where causes 
always precede their effects) in contrast with dia-
chronic relations.
Now, notice that microphysicalism is incompat-
ible with the existence of NS-emergent proper-
ties. In fact, these views entail respectively:
17. McLaughlin’s (McLaughlin B., 1997) view is an elabo-
ration of Van Cleve’s (Van Cleve J., 1990) view. Historically, 
these are reminiscent of Broad’s (Broad C. D., 1925) emer-
gentism.
18. In McLaughlin’s definition of NS-Emergence, the 
‘emergence base’ of property P is constituted by the “proper-
ties the parts of w have taken separately or in other combi-
nations” (McLaughlin B., 1997: 39).
19. According to Hüttemann (Hüttemann A., 2004), the 
attractiveness of microphysicalism derives precisely from 
the success of micro-explanation. Besides, it should be noted 
that McLaughlin (McLaughlin B., 1997) himself does not 
assert that the emergent properties he defines do exist.
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(MPH) Every high property is logically 
necessitated by basic items.
(EMG) Some high properties are not meta-
physically but nomologically necessitated, via 
fundamental laws, by basic items.
In the following section I will argue in favour 
of EMG on the base of contemporary physics. 
Certainly, it is not possible to prove thereby that 
microphysicalism is definitely flawed, since any 
scientific theory can be false. However, micro-
physicalism is motivated by the acceptance of 
contemporary theories in natural science, and 
thus it is legitimate to argue against it using con-
temporary physics.
Nonlocality and 
NS-Emergence
In order to argue for EMG I will elaborate 
a case with the EPR experiments and Bell’s 
Theorem20. It has three significant advantages: 
First, it involves determination relations within 
microphysics, avoiding problems that appear in 
attempts to relate properties that belong to signifi-
cantly different ‘levels’ (e.g. the microphysical and 
the macrophysical) or to different sciences (e.g. 
physics and biology)21. Second, this case avoids 
the causal exclusion problem (Pepper 1926; Kim 
1992, 1999, 2005)22. We will notice that quan-
tum entanglement is not epiphenomenal and 
yet poses no problem of causal overdetermina-
tion. Third, the existence of EPR correlations is 
strongly supported by empirical evidence. Indeed, 
Howard writes:
How and why the properties of a pair of pre-
viously interacting and, therefore, entangled-
quantum systems fail to supervene on the 
properties of the two individual systems taken 
separately is perfectly well understood and 
today routinely demonstrated in the labora-
tory, as in experimental tests of Bell’s theorem 
[…] By my lights, the quantum correlations 
characteristic of entangled joint states have a 
20. For a thorough and illustrative exposition without tech-
nicalities of EPR experiments and Bell’s Theorem, see (Mer-
min D., 1985).
21. Indeed, within physics itself the nature of the relation 
between the underlying quantum world and the macrosco-
pic systems is an open issue referred to as ‘the measurement 
problem’.
22. Replies to the causal exclusion argument can be found, 
e.g., in (Loewer B., 2001), (Shoemaker S., 2002), (Wood-
ward J., 2008), (Kistler M., 2009) and (Campbell J., 2010).
better claim to the status of emergent proper-
ties than do any of the other properties else-
where in nature so far nominated for the prize 
(Howard D., 2007: 150)23. 
The EPR Argument
In a famous article (Einstein A. et al., 1935), Ein-
stein, Podolsky, and Rosen claimed that quan-
tum mechanics is incomplete and thus unaccept-
able. They conceived a Gedanken experiment and 
discussed the solution that quantum mechanics 
would provide. In Bohm’s (Bohm D., 1951) ver-
sion, an ‘EPR experiment’ is as follows24:
Figure 1. Bohm’s version of an EPR experiment.
Initially, there is a source of electrons and two 
Stern-Gerlach magnets. These systems are spa-
tially separated, they are not connected by any 
further system, and the space between them is 
empty. An electron is a particle that has a ‘spin’ 
property that, when measured, will always take 
one of two possible values: +½ or -½. A Stern-
Gerlach magnet is a device for measuring the spin 
in a given direction depending on its orientation.
A row of the EPR experiment, divided in three 
consecutive intervals, proceeds as follows:
- (Δt1) Both magnets are oriented in the same 
direction α. The source contains a system 
composed of two interacting electrons that 
has a null total spin: ∑S = 025.
23. Howard (Howard D., 2007) proposes a definition of 
supervenience for the physical context, and then advances 
a definition of ‘emergence’ as the failure of supervenience. 
Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this conception of 
emergence and he does not show exactly why and how quan-
tum entanglement would violate supervenience.
24. EPR experiments can involve different types of particles 
and concern different properties. They are habitually dis-
cussed under Bohm’s version because it illustrates the situa-
tion in a simpler manner than the original EPR setup and 
makes the question of locality more salient.
25. According to quantum mechanics since the electrons are 
interacting they have become ‘entangled’.
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- (Δt2) The source emits the electrons. Elec-
tron e1 travels towards magnet M1 and elec-
tron e2 towards magnet M2.
- (Δt3) Electrons e1 and e2 encounter mag-
nets M1 and M2 respectively, and each one is 
deflected either in direction α or in direction 
-α. Thereby, a measurement (in direction α) of 
the corresponding spins is obtained: S1 = +½ 
if e1 is deflected in direction α, S1 = +½ if e1 
is deflected in direction –α, and likewise for 
e2. I will label ‘M1/e1’ and ‘M2/e2’ the events 
of e1 and e2 interacting with M1 and M2 
respectively26.
Quantum mechanics predicts two possible out-
comes for each row of this experiment: {S1 = +½; 
S2 = -½} or {S1 = -½; S2 = +½}. The combinations 
{S1 = +½; S2 = +½} and {S1 = -½; S2 = -½} are 
excluded. This is not surprising, since recall that 
∑S = 0. It also predicts that the two possible out-
comes are equiprobable.
Now, it happens that quantum mechanics repre-
sents the state of the system composed of e1 and 
e2 with a ‘wave function’ that does not attribute 
individual values for S1 and S2 during Δt1 and 
Δt2; e1 and e2 are represented as being in ‘entan-
gled’ states27. However, for Einstein et al. S1 and 
S2 must always have definite values. Thus, they 
claimed that quantum mechanics provides an 
incomplete representation of reality28.
In fact, quantum mechanics provides a ‘holistic’ 
picture of the experiment: During Δt2 electrons 
e1 and e2 are not in states with a definite value 
for their spins, but in a ‘superposition’ of states: e1 
is in a superposition of [S1 = +½; S1 = -½], with 
each of these sub-states having the same prob-
ability of obtaining, and analogously for e2. Now, 
when the measurements M1/e1 and M2/e2 occur, 
S1 and S2 acquire definite values that are corre-
lated as indicated. Einstein et al. claimed that this 
picture resulted from the incompleteness of the 
theory. If this picture were correct, a principle of 
26. In some interpretations of quantum mechanics these 
events cause the wave function to ‘collapse’ (one of them 
alone is sufficient for the collapse). The entanglement is 
thusbroken and there is a ‘decoherence’.
27. Technically, a ‘wave function’ is a function defined in a 
Hilbert space (a complex vector space). When a wave func-
tion, φ12, represents two systems, these are said to be entan-
gled when φ12 cannot be formulated as the product of two 
functions, φ1 and φ2, representing these systems separately.
28. The details of the formulation of the argument are sup-
pressed for being unnecessary for present purposes.
‘locality’ that they deemed non-negotiable would 
be violated29.
Let us consider two disjoint closed volumes 
in physical space, A and B. Locality says that a 
change in the properties of physical systems 
enclosed in A cannot determine any change in 
the properties of physical systems enclosed in B, 
unless there is some signal going from A to B. By 
a ‘signal’ I mean some wave, or some travelling 
particle, or something of the sort. In a slogan, the 
principle of locality precludes ‘spooky actions at a 
distance’. Now, the holistic picture violates local-
ity for the following reason: If, during Δt2, the 
values for S1 and S2 are not determined, at the 
moment of the measurement (during Δt3) there 
must be a physical relation between M1/e1 and 
M2/e2 which ensures that the correlations obtain, 
i.e., that only the outcomes {S1 = +½; S2 = +½} 
and {S1 = -½; S2 = +½} occur. But, ex hypothesi, 
no physical system connects M1 with M2 and, 
moreover, the measurements M1/e1 and M2/e2 
can be made simultaneously. No signal could have 
travelled from M1/e1 to M2/e2 or vice-versa.
In contrast to the holistic picture, the EPR group 
proposed an intuitive and straightforward explan-
ation: Given that ∑S = 0 and Sn = ±½, only two 
outcomes are possible. The outcome {S1 = +½; S2 
= -½} obtains when, during Δt2, e1 is in the state 
S1 = +½ and e2 in the state S2 = -½, and analo-
gously for {S1 = -½; S2 = +½}. Accordingly, the 
measurements during Δt3 only revealed the states 
that the electrons were in while travelling towards 
the detectors.
Theories along the lines of the last picture are 
called (deterministic) ‘local-hidden-variable- 
theories’ (LHVT)30. These theories, first, sup-
pose that the quantum mechanical description of 
the state of the system composed by e1 and e2 is 
incomplete in the following sense: there are ‘ele-
ments of reality’ (Einstein A., et al., 1935) that 
are not represented in the theory (the ‘hidden- 
variables’) which account for the correlations. 
Second, these theories aim at explaining the cor-
relations preserving locality.
29. Entangled systems also violate a principle of ‘separab 
lity’ which, according to (Howard D., 1985), was the primary 
reason for Einstein’s unwavering belief in the incomplete-
ness of quantum mechanics.
30. (Clauser J., Horne M., 1974) generalised Bell’s Theorem 
for the case of stochastic LHVT. For a discussion see (Brown 
H., Timpson G., forthcoming).
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For many years it was considered that no experi-
mental evidence could favour one of the men-
tioned pictures over the other. Indeed, the EPR 
argument was not meant to question the empir-
ical adequacy of quantum mechanics; the discus-
sion was purely conceptual. However, in a sem-
inal paper John Bell (Bell J., 1964) showed that 
the prediction given by quantum mechanics for 
a ‘generalised’ EPR experiment differs from any 
prediction that a local-hidden-variables-theory-
could give. This opened up the possibility for tests 
and empirical arguments.
Bell’s EPR experiment
Bell considered a slightly different set-up for 
theEPR experiment:
Figure 2. Generalised EPR experiment.
Now, there is an angle y between the orientations 
of magnets M1 and M2. Under these conditions, 
quantum mechanics provides the following pre-
diction (Bell 1987: 15)31:
(QMP) <(σx.α)(σz.β)> = -cos y
The symbols {σx; σz; α; β} stand for unitary vec-
tors, and a dot between two of them represents 
the scalar product. Respectively, vectors {α; β} 
represent the orientations of magnets M1 and 
M2 (they form an angle y), vectors {σx; σz} repre-
sent the spin-states of e1 and e2, and the products 
(σx.α) and (σz.β) represent the measurements 
M1/e1 and M2/e2.
The products (σx.α) and (σz.β) can take two pos-
sible values: +1 and -1. If we have (σx.α) = +1 this 
means that e1 was found to have its spin in direc-
tion α (the orientation of M1). If on the contrary 
we have (σx.α) = -1, this means that e1 was found 
to have its spin in the direction -α (opposite to 
the orientation of M1); analogously for (σz.β), e2 
31. This prediction is derived from the wave function that 
describes the system composed by the interacting electrons 
e1 and e2.
and M2. Accordingly, for each row of the experi-
ment there are four possible results corresponding 
to the values of (σx.α) and (σz.β): (+1; +1), (+1; 
-1), (-1; +1), or (-1; -1), and the product (σx.α) 
(σz.β) can take one of two values: +1 or -1. Now, 
the expression <(σx.α)(σz.β)> represents the sta-
tistical distribution of the product (σx.α)(σz.β) 
over several rows of the experiment.
According to QMP, each one of the four pos-
sible combinations of (σx.α) and (σz.β) has an 
associated probability that depends on the angle 
y (the angle between α and β). Let us consider 
three examples. First, take y = 0. This corresponds 
to the original EPR setup where the magnets are 
oriented in the same direction. Following QMP, 
<(σx.α)(σz.β)>= -1. This coincides with what we 
saw: Always, when one of the electrons is deflected 
in the direction of orientation of the magnet, the 
other is deflected in the opposite direction.
Second, take y = π/2. Following QMP, <((σx.α)
(σz.β)>= 0. This means that, statistically, there is 
no correlation between the results in M1/e1 and 
M2/e2. Sometimes we have (σx.α)(σz.β)= +1, 
sometimes (σx.α)(σz.β)= -1, and both situations 
are equiprobable.
Finally, take y = π/4. Following QMP, <(σx.α)
(σz.β)>= 2½ /2 ≈ 0,7. This means that it is more 
probable to obtain [(σx.α)(σz.β)]= +1 than 
[(σx.α)(σz.β)]= -1. Approximately two times out 
of three both electrons are deflected either in the 
directions of orientation of the respective meas-
uring magnets, or in directions contrary to these.
Bell’s Theorem
Bell’s theorem has different versions that result 
from the proof of a ‘Bell inequality’32. Since these 
proofs are inevitably highly technical I shall not 
present one33. However, the meaning and con-
sequences of the theorem can be presented in 
non-technical terms. 
Bell’s Theorem concerns the predictions that 
(deterministic) LHVT can provide for gener-
alised EPR experiments. According to these 
theories, each of the spin-states that e1 and 
e2 occupy (represented by σx and σz) is com-
pletely determined independently of the other 
(hence locality), by inaccessible features (hence 
32. Bell’s papers where he presents or discusses his theorem 
are compiled in (Bell J., 1987).
33. For an explanatory derivation and discussion of Bell’s 
Theorem see, e.g., (Greenstein G., Zajonic A., 1997).
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hidden- variables) that account, respectively, for 
the values of (σx.α) and (σz.β) (which represent 
the measurement M1/e1 and M2/e2)34.
The theorem, in one of its forms (Bell 1987: 37), 
results from the proof of the following inequality: 
(BT) | P(α, β) - P(α, β’) | + | P(α’, β) - P(α’, 
β’) | ≤ 2
In BT two possible orientations for each magnet 
are considered: α and α’ are orientations of M1, 
and β and β’ are orientations of M2. The function 
P represents the left hand of QMP:
P (α, β) = <(σx.α)(σz.β)>
P (α’, β) = <(σx.α’)(σz.β)>
Etc.
Bell’s Theorem states that any LHVT is con-
strained by inequality BT. Accordingly, any pre-
diction of a LHVT for the quantity on the left, 
for any values of {α; β; α’; β’}, is going to be minor 
or equal to 2.
In contrast to LHVT, quantum mechanics, as 
expected, violates BT for certain values of {α; β; 
α’; β’}. Note that, since α.β = cos y, QMP can be 
rephrased as:
(QMP) P (α, β) = - α.β
Now, let us take, e.g., {α = 0; β = 3π/8; α’ = -π/4; β’ 
= π/8}. From QMP we obtain:
P (α, β) = 1/2½
P (α, β’) = -1/2½
P (α’, β) = 1/2½
P (α’, β’) = -1/2½
With these values, the inequality in BT is violated:
| P (α, β) - P (α, β’) | + | P (α’, β) - P (α’, β’) | 
= (2) (2½) > 2
Several EPR experiments to test ‘Bell’s Inequal-
ities’ have been conducted, the most famous of 
which were by A. Aspect and his colleagues35.
34. According to local-hidden-variables-theories, the fact 
that quantum mechanics’s prediction has a statistical form, 
namely the distribution <(σx.α)(σz.β)> = -cos y, reflects our 
ignorance of the underlying mechanisms governing, on one 
hand, the behaviour of e1 when it interacts with M1, and on 
the other hand, the behaviour of e2 when it interacts with 
M2.
35. The first experiments to test Bell’s inequalities were do-
neby (Clauser J., et al., 1969) and (Freedman S., and Clau-
ser J., 1972). Aspect’s experiments were done in the early 
eighties. See: (Aspect A., Grangier P., and Roger G., 1981); 
(Aspect A., Grangier P., Roger G., 1982); (Aspect A., Deli-
They showed a systematic violation of Bell’sIn-
equalities and great accuracy in the predictions of 
quantum mechanics.
Note that what Bell’s Theorem and the corres-
ponding experiments strongly suggest is that 
theories that assume the existence of hidden vari-
ables and locality (i.e. LHVT) cannot be accurate. 
A nonlocal-hidden-variables-theory can repro-
duce the predictions of quantum mechanics, as is 
the case with Bohm’s (Bohm D., 1951) theory36.
The correlations predicted by quantum mechan-
ics do not depend on whether or not the measure-
ments of spin are realised simultaneously. Thus, 
the hypothesis of the existence of unnoticed sig-
nals connecting events M1/e1 and M2/e2 must be 
discarded (unless one is willing to sacrifice a prin-
ciple of relativity which says that there is an upper 
limit for the speed of any signal connecting two 
spatiotemporal events)37. Indeed, no ‘information’ 
can be transmitted from M1/e1 to M2/e2: from 
the results M1/e1 it is not possible to deduce the 
results M2/e2, except for the particular cases with 
α = ± β (the original EPR cases)38.
In short, Bell’s Theorem shows that the system 
composed by e1 and e2 behaves in a way, described 
by QMP, which does not result from a causal 
interaction between intrinsic properties of e1 and 
e239. In the next section, I will show why Bell’s 
theorem plus the empirical adequacy of quantum 
mechanics undermine microphysicalism.
Microphysicalism and the 
EPR experiment
Recall McLaughlin’s definition of NS-Emer-
gence, and consider, in the EPR experiment, the 
system that is constituted by the entangled elec-
trons. On the one hand, this system, w, has two 
bard J., and Roger G., 1982).
36. Bohm’s theory is nonlocal in a very deep sense. In the 
words of Greenstein and Zajonic, it “goes beyond simple 
nonlocality, and calls upon us to see the world as an undivi-
ded whole” (Greenstein G., Zajonic A., 1997: 148).
37. For a proof that the EPR correlations are compatible 
with special relativity see (Shimony A., 1986).
38. It could be claimed that in the particular cases α = ± β 
there is information flow. However, if there were informa-
tion flow in these cases there should be information flow in 
every case. QMP does not give to the cases with α = ± β any 
privileged status.
39. Causality is such that, if event c causes event e, c hap-
pens before e. The idea of instantaneous and yet causal re-
lations is contrary to relativistic physics and, in general, to 
current orthodoxy.
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parts, corresponding to e1 and e2. Each of these 
electrons occupies a spin-state (represented by σx 
and σz), and thus each part of w can be said to 
have the property of being in a spin-state40. It is 
in virtue of these properties, p1 and p2, that e1 
and e2 are deflected when they encounter mag-
nets M1 and M241. On the other hand, w occu-
pies a state of quantum entanglement of its con-
stituents e1 and e2, and thus w can be said to have 
the high (or ‘systemic’) property P of being in this 
state42. It is in virtue of w having property P that 
the measurements M1/e1 and M2/e2 produce 
results that have the statistical correlations that 
QMP captures.
Now, it seems clear that P supervenes on p1 and 
p2 with nomological necessity, not with logical 
necessity, in virtue of fundamental laws of nature. 
First, the relation between p1, p2 and P is nomo-
logical. In fact, there is a correlation among σx 
and σz, and thus a relation between p1, p2 and P, 
which are contingent. The prediction that quan-
tum mechanics provides via its laws, i.e. QMP, 
has empirical content. Indeed, according to Bell’s 
Theorem any LHVT would make a different pre-
diction. Second, P (nomologically) supervenes 
on p1 and p2. Two systems w and w’, which are 
both constituted by two interacting electrons that 
instantiate p1 and p2, cannot differ with respect 
to instantiating P. Third, underlying QMP there 
are fundamental laws. In particular, that freely 
interacting systems become entangled is a fun-
damental principle of quantum mechanics; it is 
not derived from other principles that would be 
more fundamental. In sum, the EPR experiments 
and Bell’s Theorem seem to show that there are 
physical systems (at least the ones involved in 
these experiments) which instantiate properties 
that are something over and above the properties 
of their constituent parts.
Another way to see the implications of the EPR 
experiments for microphysicalism is to focus on 
40. It is unusual to refer to quantum systems as having pro-
perties. These are normally said to occupy states, described 
by the corresponding wave functions. However, given the 
definitions proposed by Chalmers (Chalmers D., 1996) of 
‘supervenience’ and by McLaughlin (McLaughlin B., 1997) 
of ‘emergence’, I should also talk in terms of ‘properties’. 
Thus, when talking about a system that is in a state S, I will 
say that ‘it has the property’ of being in a state S. 
41. Recall that to say that e1 and e2 occupy spin-states σx 
and σz is not to say that there is a definite value for their res-
pective spins before the events M1/e1 and M2/e2 take place.
42. This state is represented by a wave function from which 
QMP is derived.
the significance of Bell’s Theorem. A LHVT sup-
poses that the parts of w, e1 and e2, individually 
instantiate some properties (corresponding to the 
hidden variables), h1 and h2 respectively, which 
completely determine the behaviour of the system, 
particularly, the property P of w. That no LHVT 
can be accurate means that the system w has a 
property that does not result with metaphysical 
necessity from the properties of its individual 
constituents.
Note that P is causally efficacious. Let us adopt 
the following criteria for causality, restricted to 
the domain of Physics: An event c causes an event 
e if and only if: (i) There is a nomological relation 
between c and e, (ii) c temporally precedes e, and 
(iii) there is a transfer of energy—a conserved 
quantity—from c to e43. Now, take ‘c’ as the event 
corresponding to the emission of the two elec-
trons by the source, and ‘e’ as the conjoint event 
{M1/e1; M2/e2} that reveals nonlocal correla-
tions. Clearly, there is a causal relation between 
c and e. Firstly, there is a nomological relation 
between event c and e, and c precedes e. After the 
emission of a pair of electrons, the interactions 
M1/e1 and M2/e2 occur following the pattern 
given by QMT. Secondly, there is a transmis-
sion of energy (by means of a collision) from the 
source of electrons to the magnets M1 and M2 
which makes them flash44. Now, the causal rela-
tion between c and e constitutively involves (given 
Bell’s Theorem) property P. It is this property 
what is causally responsible for a property e has, 
namely, the correlations obtaining between M1/
e1 and M2/e2. Accordingly, P makes a difference 
in causal interactions: it has the causal power of 
producing correlations45.
Additionally, note that P has a downward causal 
influence which, as previously announced, eludes 
the causal overdetermination problem. This prob-
lem arises when an effect has more than one suf-
ficient cause, and this is not the case with e. As we 
saw, even though the systemic property P caus-
ally influences the behaviour of the constituents 
of the system e1 and e2, only c causes e. In fact, P’s 
43. For a defence of Conserved quantity theories of causa-
lity see, e.g., Dowe (2000) and Salmon (1998).
44. In general, every device that detects X requires to be 
perturbed by X, and this involves an energy transfer.
45. Alternatively, we can say that because the EPR system 
has the nonlocal property P, event c causes event e.
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causal work is to constraint the behaviour of e1 
and e2 in the way described by QMT46.
In sum, the systems of the EPR experiments 
seem to violate MPH and hence microphysical-
ism. There is no metaphysical necessitation from 
(1) the fact that an electron is a particle with a 
spin that, when measured, is found to be such that 
it can only take two opposite values with equal 
probability, to (2) the fact that a system consti-
tuted by two electrons and with null total spin 
behaves, when the spins are measured, in accord-
ance with QMP. By contrast, the systems of the 
EPR experiments seem to support EMP, i.e., they 
seem to instantiate a high property nomologic-
ally necessitated, via fundamental laws, by basic 
items. 
Back to Chalmers’ Zombie 
Argument
In the previous sections I questioned the validity 
of Chalmers’ Zombie Argument, by arguing that 
there are good reasons to consider that micro-
physicalism, and thus the claim that “high-level 
facts and laws are entailed [with logical neces-
sity] by all the microphysical facts” (Chalmers 
1996: 71), are wrong. I did so by showing a case 
in favour of NS-Emergentism.
To be sure, I did not give reasons to consider that 
phenomenal consciousness is a NS-emergent 
property. Indeed, from the fact (if it is a fact) that 
some relatively simple quantum systems do have 
NS-emergent properties, nothing seems to follow 
about the nature of consciousness. In principle, 
only extremely complex macroscopic biological 
organisms are conscious, and consciousness 
raises distinctive philosophical questions. How-
ever, notice that the fact (if it is a fact) that some 
relatively simple quantum systems instantiate 
NS-emergent properties asks for a non-micro-
physicalist ontology of the natural world, which 
opens up the possibility for there being emergent 
properties beyond microphysical systems47. Now, 
there are reasons which are independent of any 
46. See Kistler (2009) for an elaboration of the idea that 
the causal powers of emergent properties consist in being 
constraints on the behaviour of entities at lower levels.
47. Indeed, quantum mechanics does not restrict entan-
glement to microphysical systems composed by a few par-
ticles. In principle, any interacting physical systems become 
entangled. Of course, there is the question of why we do not 
experience (at the macroscopic level) any superposition of 
states, which is the core of the measurement problem. For a 
discussion see, e.g., (Brown H., Wallace C., 2005).
consideration about quantum mechanics to hold 
that consciousness must be an emergent property, 
emerging from physical items48.
I would argue that the prima facie conceivabil-
ity of Chalmers’ zombies results from the fact 
that consciousness is an intrinsic property. As 
Chalmers himself says when discussing Type-F 
(or ‘Russellian’) monism, “physics characterizes 
physical entities and properties by their relations 
to one another and to us. […] physics says noth-
ing about the intrinsic nature of these entities and 
properties” (Chalmers, D., 2010: 133). Therefore, 
“[w]e only think we are conceiving of a physically 
identical system [when we conceive the zombie 
world] because we overlook intrinsic properties” 
(Chalmers, D., 2010: 134). It is important to note 
that here Chalmers refers to intrinsic properties 
of particles; if consciousness is a NS-emergent 
property, it is an intrinsic property of composed 
(and very likely extremely complex) physical 
systems49.
To finish, I will briefly discuss five objections to 
the argument I have presented.
Objection 1: The claim that consciousness could 
be a NS-emergent property coincides with Chal-
mers’ (Chalmers D., 1996) “naturalistic dualism” 
view: he claims, precisely, that consciousness 
supervenes nomologically, but not metaphysically, 
on the microphysical. 
Reply: Chalmers says when presenting natur-
alistic dualism: “It is therefore more natural to 
consider experience as a fundamental property 
that is not a physical property, and to consider 
the psychophysical laws as fundamental laws of 
nature that are not laws of physics” (Chalmers D., 
1996: 128 – 129). Accordingly, for Chalmers the 
psychophysical laws that would be involved in 
the nomological supervenience of consciousness 
relate something physical with something that is 
not physical (in accordance with the conclusion 
of The Zombie Argument). This contrasts sharply 
with the conception of NS-emergentism that I 
advanced, which involves physical laws that relate 
physical items.  
48. In (Bernal Velásquez R. J., 2012) I argue that emergen-
tism about consciousness is the best alternative if one is a 
materialist realist about consciousness. About emergence in 
the philosophy of mind see (MacDonald C., MacDonald G., 
2010).
49. In (Bernal Velásquez R. J., 2012) I argue that 
consciousness is an intrinsic property and that it is instantia-
ted in complex systems.
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Follow-up to Objection 1: Suppose there are 
indeed psychophysical laws in virtue of which 
consciousness NS-emerges. Now, there is still the 
possibility for consciousness to be non-physical. 
In fact, it is arbitrary to take the psychophysical 
laws as being ‘laws of physics’ and, thereby, to 
affirm that consciousness is physical, instead of 
taking the psychophysical laws—following Chal-
mers—just as fundamental laws of nature that do 
not suppose that consciousness is physical.
Reply: I am not sure how to understand in what 
sense a law of nature could relate something 
physical with something non-physical. These 
laws are, minimally, statements that capture 
regularities in nature. Now, if there is a regular-
ity involving a paradigmatically physical item 
M and some item N, this seems to be sufficient 
for N to fall in the category of having a physical 
nature. Why we think that, e.g., electromagnetic 
waves are something physical? After all, they are 
not objects of experience in any ordinary sense of 
the term; we represent these waves through quite 
abstract mathematical equations.
Suppose there is some item N whose meta-
physical nature is an open question. Now, sup-
pose we establish the existence of a law of nature 
relating N with some paradigmatic physical item 
M. Then, thanks to our knowledge of this law, we 
are able to produce or manipulate N, to explain 
or predict its instances, to account for its inter-
actions with M (and thereby with other physical 
items), and so forth, just as we are able to do with 
electromagnetic waves. This seems sufficient to 
claim that N has a physical nature50.
Certainly, if N is an epiphenomenal property, the 
previous line of thought does not apply: it is not 
possible to determine if N is instantiated, N does 
not interact with anything, and so forth. But then, 
I do not see on what grounds we could possibly 
claim that there indeed exists a property N, and 
that it falls under some law of nature.
Objection 2: Chalmers wrote: “high-level facts 
and laws are entailed by all the microphysical facts 
(perhaps along with microphysical laws)” (Chalmers 
D., 1996: 71, my italics). So, let us include within 
the microphysical laws those that correspond to 
50. Note that this line of argument leads to the claim of 
the instability of interactionism, i.e., of Type-D dualism in 
Chalmers’ (Chalmers D., 2002) taxonomy. The factual exis-
tence of nomological interactions between conscious states 
and physical states (which may include brain states) would 
be sufficient to classify consciousness as physical.
quantum entanglement. Thereby, the putative 
NS-emergent property P would supervene on the 
microphysical with logical necessity.
Reply: This strategy would make microphysical-
ism collapse into the view I advocate, namely, that 
everything is either a physical item or L-super-
venes on physical items. If in global superven-
ience physicalist metaphysics one includes in the 
supervenience base the NS-emergent property 
P, by the same token one should include all the 
different kinds of NS-emergent properties that 
exist, and notice that there are no reasons to dis-
card them in complex and macroscopic systems. 
Thereby, firstly, one would be giving up micro-
physicalism. Secondly, if consciousness in par-
ticular is a NS-emergent property, and as such, 
one has to include it in the supervenience base, 
this amounts to considering it as physical.   
Objection 3: Suppose that in the actual world W 
there is in fact a law L in virtue of which con-
sciousness NS-emerges. Now, consider a world 
W* that lacks L, and hence consciousness, but is 
otherwise identical to W in every respect. W* is 
conceivable and would be a zombie world: every 
physical item in W* (except consciousness) would 
have its counterpart in W.
Reply: Ontological views of emergentism, and 
in particular emergentism about consciousness, 
usually conceive emergent properties as having 
causal powers. Indeed, it is common to argue 
for the existence of an emergent property E on 
the basis of Alexander’s Dictum (Alexander S., 
1920): E is real because its instantiation endows 
its bearer with irreducible causal powers. So, W* 
is not really conceivable: in the absence of L it 
would differ from W in many respects, namely, 
regarding the events directly or indirectly related 
to consciousness in a causal way.
Objection 4: Chalmers writes: “a microphysical 
description of the world specifies a distribution 
of particles, fields, and waves in space and time. 
These basic systems are characterized by their 
spatiotemporal properties and properties such as 
mass, charge, and quantum wave function state” 
(Chalmers D., 2010: 120, my italics). So, suppose 
that in the actual world W there are NS-emer-
gent properties, and consider a world W* that is 
a spatiotemporal microphysical replica of W, i.e., 
not a time slice microphysical replica. The full his-
tory of every basic item in W has its counterpart 
in W*. Is it conceivable for W and W* to differ 
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in non-microphysical levels? Apparently not: 
in all probability, spatiotemporal high levels do 
L-supervene on the spatiotemporal microphysical 
level. Thus it seems that, when W* is appropriately 
formulated, The Zombie Argument is valid even 
if there are NS-emergent properties in W.
Reply: This is a subtle point involving downward 
causation whose thorough discussion exceeds 
the scope of the present paper. Thus, I will only 
advance two remarks about the following scenar-
ios: (1) there is no downward causation; (2) there 
is downward causation.
(1) Suppose the NS-emergent properties in 
W do not have downward causal powers. Then, 
it is certainly conceivable for W and W* to dif-
fer in non-microphysical levels: In W, on top 
of the basic items, there are further items (the 
NS-emergent ones).
However, that a NS-emergent property has 
causal powers seems to entail that it has down-
ward effects and, as I said, epiphenomenal emer-
gent properties are not what ontological emer-
gentism is usually about51. Thus, this first scenario 
is not really relevant.
(2) Suppose that the NS-emergent properties in 
W do have downward causal powers: There are 
top-down causal effects that influence the behav-
iour at the microphysical level. Now, recall that 
W*, ex hypothesi, is identical to W at this level. The 
microphysical level in W* behaves like the one in 
W despite the absence of NS-emergent properties. 
In this scenario, is it possible for W and W* to 
differ at high levels? I will focus on a particular 
conception of the causal powers of NS-emer-
gent properties and argue that W and W*, despite 
having the same microphysical dynamics, differ 
regarding the laws of nature. If one is a necessitar-
ian about laws, this might be a decisive point. If, 
on the contrary, one is a regularist or an antireal-
ist, this might seem innocuous52.
51. The entailment from an emergent property having cau-
sal powers to it having downward effects is a critical step in 
the formulation of the causal exclusion problem. See, e.g., 
(Kim J., 2005). 
52. For the regularists, statements of laws of nature only 
capture the regularities we observe in the natural world. 
Accordingly, laws are nothing over and above these regu-
larities. By contrast, for necessitarians the laws of nature are 
something over and above mere regularities. Their existence 
explains why some regularities factually obtain, and why 
they would obtain were counterfactual situations (framed in 
physically possible worlds) realised. See, e.g., (Schrenk M., 
forthcoming).
In the case for emergentism that I discussed, the 
causal role of the NS-emergent property is a con-
straining role. In virtue of property P, e1 and e2 
behave in a correlated way when the spin meas-
urements occur. Let us take it that, in general, 
when it comes to causality NS-emergent proper-
ties act as constraints for the behaviour at lower 
levels53. Now:
Take two subsequent times t1 and t2 in the his-
tory of the actual world W, and two subsequent 
times t1* and t2* in the history of W*, such that: 
(i) between t1 and t2 there were downward effects 
(in W) due to the existence of a NS-emergent 
property P; (ii) the evolution of the basic items of 
W* between t1* and t2* mirrors the evolution of 
the basic items of W between t1 and t254.
Clearly, the microphysical evolution of W between 
t1 and t2 is nomologically determined by P: W 
finished at t2 in a particular microstate W(2) 
partly because of P. By contrast, W* finished at 
time t2* in a particular microstate W*(2) partly by 
chance. In W there is a law of nature, namely the 
one that captures the effect of P, which W* lacks. 
Objection 5: Forget about microphysicalism. The 
core of The Zombie Argument is the idea that no 
phenomenal fact can be metaphysically necessi-
tated by physical facts; it points to the existence 
of an ontological gap. Now, to judge that con-
sciousness may be a NS-emergent property is to 
deny the existence of this gap, since consciousness 
would emerge exclusively from physical stuff. 
Reply: I agree with the idea that phenomenal 
facts cannot result from physical facts in virtue of 
a metaphysical necessitation relation. But, firstly, 
recall that I take NS-emergentism as a form of 
physicalism. Therefore, phenomenal facts, despite 
our deeply grounded dualist intuitions, are taken 
as physical facts. Secondly, recall that NS-emer-
gence involves a nomological, not a metaphysical, 
relation, mediated by fundamental laws of nature. 
It would be in virtue of a law of nature that a 
complex physical entity would have phenomenal 
properties even though none of its physical parts 
has them. But this last point, clearly, is persuasive 
only for someone who holds a realist and necessi-
tarian view about laws.
53. (Bishop R.,  Atmanspacher H., 2006) and (Kistler M., 
2009), among others, propose this view. 
54. Note that t1* and t2* do exist ex hypothesi.
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Conclusion
Some arguments against the thesis that con-
sciousness is a physical property, and in particular 
Chalmers’ Zombie Argument, suppose the valid-
ity of ‘microphysicalism’: roughly, the view that all 
the physical properties of composed physical sys-
tems are metaphysically necessitated by their fun-
damental physical constituents. Through the dis-
cussion of the EPR scenario and Bell’s Theorem, 
I questioned the validity of microphysicalism and 
favoured emergentist metaphysics in the sense 
of the nomological supervenience views. If this 
metaphysics happens to be correct, Chalmers’ 
Argument loses part of its grounds, and, a possi-
bility opens up for consciousness to be a physical 
property.
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